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THE ROLE OF THE CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCHOLAR:
THE CALL FOR A MODERN ST. BENEDICT

LEE

J.

STRANG*

INTRODUCTION

In his book, After Virtue, the philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre
issued a stinging indictment of modern society.' In the famous
last sentence of After Virtue, MacIntyre stated that "[w]e," our
society, "are waiting... for another-doubtless very differentSt. Benedict."2
I want to propose that Christian law professors should see
themselves and their role in accord with MacIntyre's call. In this
Article, I will explain why. First, I will review St. Benedict's life
and argue that he created the institution, the form of community-Western monasticism-that preserved much of classical
civilization and which was instrumental in synthesizing a new,
Christian civilization. Second, I will discuss the state of American
culture as diagnosed by MacIntyre.
I will then propose how Christian legal scholars should
respond: what our role is in American society. I will argue that
Christian law professors have three analytically distinct possible
roles: building Christian law schools, rebuilding Christian law
schools, and what I will label "engaging in the debate." Scholars
may assume different roles over their careers and aspects of more
than one role concurrently.
Then I will briefly discuss how one can know what role(s)
one should assume, as a Christian legal scholar. Lastly, I will
return to St. Benedict and how his legacy of preserving and creating offers a model for Christian law professors fifteen hundred
years later.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Ave Maria School of Law. The author
would like to thank his loving wife, Elizabeth, for her sacrifice to allow him to
write this Article. Many thanks to Bryce Poole and Jonathan Greenberg for
their research assistance. The author would also like to thank Kevin Lee for his
comments and suggestions.
1. ALASDAIR M.ACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 2 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE].

2.

Id. at 263.
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SAINT BENEDICT: PRESERVER OF CLASSICAL CIVILIZATION AND
BUILDER OF A CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION

To understand why MacIntyre would invoke the name of St.
Benedict, I will briefly review St. Benedict's life.3 Saint Benedict
was born to a Roman noble at Nursia, a village in the mountains
North of Rome, in the year 480.' Benedict lived during the time
of the disintegration of the West. Towards the end of the fourth
century the Constantinian revival of the Empire began to give
way and the Germanic tribes again invaded: in 380 the Western
Goths attacked Constantinople; in 382 the Eastern Goths
invaded Asia Minor; in 396 the Western Goths overran Italy and
in 410 sacked Rome; in 420 the Western Goths settled in Spain
and established their own kingdom; in 429 the Vandals overran
Roman North Africa and established a kingdom; in 450 the
Angles and Saxons overran Britain; and four years prior to Benedict's birth, the last Emperor of the West was deposed by
Odoacer. Benedict went to Rome in his youth to study.6 However,
when he was approximately twenty years old, he left Rome to
escape the licentious world that had surrounded him.7 As his
famous biographer Pope St. Gregory the Great wrote: "But for as
much as he saw many by reason of such learning fall to dissolute
and lewd life, he drew back his foot, which he had as it were not
set forth in the world, lest, entering too far in acquaintance
therewith, he likewise might have fallen into that dangerous and
godless gulf."'
Benedict settled in a town called Enfide (likely modem
Affile) about forty miles from Rome. After performing many
miracles, becoming a hermit for three years, and establishing a
number of monasteries, Benedict established the famous monas3.

The primary historical source for St. Benedict's life is ST. GREGORY THE
(Philip Lee Warner 1911) (593 A.D.). For a review of St.

GREAT, DIALOGUES

Benedict's impact see CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, THE FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM

169-71 (1967) [hereinafter DAWSON, FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM]. For an
overview of monasticism in general, see 9 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
786-804 (2d ed. 2003).
4. Hugh Edmond Ford, St. Benedict of Nursia, THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1907), available at http://www. newadvent.org/cathen/02467b.htm (Oct.
27, 2005).
5. R.R. PALMER ET AL., A HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD 18 (9th ed.
1960).
6. ST. GREGORY THE GREAT, supra note 3, at 51.
7.

Id.

8.

Id.
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tery at Monte Cassino around 520.' While there, Benedict wrote
his famous Regula Sancti Benedicti, or Rule of St. Benedict, to govern
the life of his monks. 10
In establishing Monte Cassino and writing his Rule, Benedict
created Western monasticism. Men and women of faith entered
monasteries to worship God, live in an intimate community with
other Christians, and leave a declining world behind. The Benedictine Rule of monastic life and the communal practice developed at Monte Cassino ordered the lives of most Western monks
for the next six hundred years."l During this time monks preserved much of the culture, learning, texts, and practices of the
ancient world that was then falling away.12 The monastic communities preserved the corpus of the ancient world until the
High Middles Ages when the new peoples of Europe were able to
reclaim what was lost and begin to build a new, different, Christian civilization.
During their golden age, the monasteries of Western
Europe, modeled on Benedict's example, were centers of spiritual, intellectual, cultural, and economic life.1" As the historian
Christopher Dawson noted: "[I] t was the monasteries that were
the saviors of Christian culture and of the Christian way of life.
The abbey was a microcosm of Christian culture, an island which
preserved the tradition of Christian culture."1 4 The monks dutifully employed themselves in manual arts such as farming, liberal
arts such as teaching, and speculative activities such as theology.15 Benedict was, therefore, instrumental in creating the
means-the form of community-that preserved much of what
was good from the classical world, which was collapsing.
But that is not the end of the story. Western monasticism
also played a crucial role in synthesizing a new, Christian civilization out of the remnants of the classical Roman and Greek civilization that was passing away and the new Germanic cultures that
had overtaken Western Europe. Unlike their Eastern counterparts who "were retreating from the dying culture of the ancient
9.

THE SAINTS: A CONCISE BIOGRAPHIcAL DICTIONARY

83-84 (John Coul-

son ed., 1958).

10. Id. at 84.
11. Id. Evidence of the popularity of the Rule is that early translations of
the Rule from almost every European language remain extant. ST. GREGORY THE
GREAT,

12.

supra note 3, at xxiv.
TERRENCE KARDONG,

THE BENEDICTINES

145 (1988) ("The monks

played an even more important transitional role in the production and preser-

vation of manuscripts.").
13. Id.
14. DAWSON, FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM, supra note 3, at 189.
15. KARDONG, supra note 12, at 144-47.
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world" into the deserts, Western monasticism "was becoming the
creator of a new Christian culture."' 6 Western monasticism, following Sts. Augustine and Basil, centered monastic life around
the community based on "the social nature of man and the Christian doctrine of the common life of the Mystical Body."' 7 Western monasticism's greater openness found its way into Benedict's
Rule.' 8
While the first step in achieving this synthesis was the preservation of classical thought and culture, the second step was bringing the Germanic conquerors of Europe to Christianity. The
monks were instrumental in converting the tribes to Christianity. 9 For example, in 596 Pope St. Gregory sent the monk, St.
Augustine, on a mission to England after Roman civilization had
been eliminated by the tribal migrations.20 Saint Augustine's
mission brought with it St. Benedict's Rule and established the
great monasteries at Hexham, Jarrow, and Wearmouth." The
monks drawn to these monasteries came from both Roman and
German stock. Monks following the Rule of Benedict evangelized,
besides Britain, the tribes in northern and central Europe such
as the Saxons, the Danes, Swedes, Norwegians, Slavs, and
22
Hungarians.
The monasteries served as centers for education of the new
elites in Western Europe along with the men (and women) of
lower classes who became monks (and nuns) or who received
their education as part of the monastery's charitable work. 23 The
monks "shared a common Latin Christian culture which they
24
communicated" to their pupils.
The monasteries also assimilated positive aspects of the barbarian culture with the classical Christian tradition. For instance,
Christian poetry made "use of the traditional heroic imagery...
in poems like The Dream of the Rood or Andreas.'' 25 And the monks
created Christian historiography whose subject was the new peo16.

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE

49 (1991) [hereinafter DAWSON, RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE].

17.

Id. at 47.

18.
19.

Id. at 48.

20.

Id. at 170.

DAWSON, FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM, supra note

3, at 173.

21. Id.
22. See id. at 171; NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 3, at 791.
23. DAWSON, FORMATION OF CHRISTENDOM, supra note 3, at 175-76,
184-86.
24. Id. at 185.
25. DAWSON, RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 16, at 52. I do not
want to overstate the intellectual contribution of Western monasticism. Its
monks were primarily concerned with preserving past learning and passing that
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ples of Europe,
such as the Venerable Bede's EcclesiasticalHistory
26
of England.

In this way monasteries became the great cultural centers of
Europe. During the missionary activity of the late eighth and
early ninth centuries, which was carried out primarily by monks,
the monasteries founded were not simple affairs. These monasteries were meant to serve as the religious, cultural, and economic centers of their areas: they included "a vast complex of
buildings, churches, workshops, store-houses, offices, schools,
and alms-houses, housing
a whole population of dependants,
27
workers and servants."
Perhaps the most important practical aspect of the rise of
Western monasticism along the lines created by St. Benedict was
the economic success of the monasteries.2 8 The monks ventured
into parts of the vast areas of Europe left a wilderness through
depopulation (caused by the barbarian invasions) and brought
them into cultivation. 29 When one monastery became overcrowded the abbot would send a group of monks to establish a
daughter house where the monks would repeat what had been
done so often already: cutting down the forests, building a
monastery, cultivating the land, providing religious services to
(any) neighbors, educating, and performing charitable works.3 °
Slowly, through the centuries, a new, Christian society was
created by "the grafting of Latin Christian traditions on the
native barbarian stock."'" This new entity known as Christendom
was the product of-in no small measure-St. Benedict's monastic vision and his Rule.
II.

MACINTYRE'S CALL FOR A MODERN ST. BENEDICT: His
ASSESSMENT OF AMERICAN (AND WESTERN)

CULTURE

AND THE AFTER VIRTUE PROJECT

At the end of After Virtue, published in 1981, MacIntyre
referred to St. Benedict. He stated:
It is always dangerous to draw too precise parallels between
one historical period and another; and among the most
on to the new nations of Europe and less concerned with original contributions. Id. at 64-65.
26. BEDE'S ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH PEOPLE (A.M. Sellar
trans., 1907).

27.
28.
29.

DAWSON, RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE, supra note 16, at 63.
PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY 148-52 (1976).
See id. at 148-49; DAWSON, RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE, supra note

at 53.

30.

31.

28, at 148-52.
DAWSON, RISE OF WESTERN CULTURE, supra note

JOHNSON, supra note

16,

at

51.

16,

64
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misleading of such parallels are those which have been
drawn between our own age in Europe and North America
and the epoch in which the Roman Empire declined into
the Dark Ages. Nonetheless certain parallels there are. A
crucial turning point in that earlier history occurred when
men and women of good will turned aside from the task of
shoring up the Roman imperium and ceased to identify the
continuation of civility and moral community with the
maintenance of that imperium. What they set themselves to
achieve instead . . . was the construction of new forms of
community within which the moral life could be sustained
so that both morality and civility might survive the coming
ages of barbarism and darkness. If my account of our
moral condition is correct, we ought also to conclude that
for some time now we too have reached that turning point.
What matters at this stage is the construction of local forms
of community within which civility and the intellectual
moral life can be sustained through the new dark ages
which are already upon us. . . . This time however the
barbarians are not waiting beyond the frontiers; they have
already been governing us for quite some time. And it is
our lack of consciousness of this that constitutes part of
our predicament. We are waiting ... for another-doubtless very different-St. Benedict.32
Why a different St. Benedict? And what is different about the
modern St. Benedict that MacIntyre envisions? To answer these
questions, below I review MacIntyre's diagnosis for our society.
Alasdair MacIntyre was born in Scotland in 1929 and went to
graduate school for philosophy in 1949."3 He was a Marxist during this period, and his writing up to 1971 was sustained social
criticism from this standpoint.3 4 MacIntyre immigrated to the
United States in 1971 and, after a "period of sometimes painfully
self-critical reflection," he began what has become known as the
After Virtue project.3" Part-and-parcel of MacIntyre's shift away
from Marxism-and perhaps the impetus for the After Virtue project-was his conversion to Catholicism.3 6
32. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 1, at 263.
33. Mark C. Murphy, Introduction, in ALASDAIR MAcINYrRE 1 (Mark C.
Murphy ed., 2003).
34. Id. at 2.

35.

Id. at 1.

36.

Or perhaps the philosophical reflection which led to After Virtue pro-

vided the impetus for his conversion to Catholicism.
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After Virtue, Maclntyre's most famous work, provided the
foundation for his subsequent work.3 7 Maclntyre's works that
continue the course set out in After Virtue are: WhoseJustice? Which
Rationality?,3 Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, and most
recently, Dependent Rational Animals.4" Primary among the goals
of the After Virtue project is an accurate diagnosis of our society's
current ethical discourse, an analysis of how we arrived at our
present state, and a prescription for a rational, coherent, and
adequate ethical discourse.
In After Virtue MacIntyre argued that our culture's "language
of morality is in [a] state of grave disorder." 4 1 We use words"fragments"-of morality, but because these words and the ideas
they represent have been ripped from their original "conceptual
scheme" they "now lack th[eir] contexts. "42
In our society this has led to "interminable" moral debate
for which "[t] here seems to be no rational way of securing moral
agreement in our culture."4 3 A good example of this phenomenon is abortion: how many of us have had discussions (arguments?) over abortion only to leave the discussion with the
feeling that we have accomplished nothing?
MacIntyre points to three revealing characteristics of the
stunted moral debate in our society. First are the conflicting,
incommensurable premises that people bring to moral debates
such as abortion. One person in an abortion debate starts from
the premise that individual autonomy is valuable and, hence,
those states of affairs that promote autonomy should be
encouraged. Think of the plurality's argument in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,4 4 which is very similar to the arguments put
37. See, e.g., ALASDAIR MAcINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS" WHY
HuMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES X (1999) ("[T]his book is not only a continuation of, but also a correction of some of my earlier enquiries in After Virtue,
Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry.") [hereinafter MAcINrYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMMAs].
38. ALASDAIR MACIN-RE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988)

[hereinafter
39.

MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?].
MAcINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY.
GENEALOGY, AND TRADITION (1990) [hereinafter MAcINTYRE,

ALASDAIR

ENCYCLOPAEDIA,

THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY].

40.
41.
42.

MAcINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 37.
MAcINYRE, AFTrER VIRTUE, supra note 1, at 2.
Id.

43. Id. at 6.
44. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)
("These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person
may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.").

66

NOTRE DAM. JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBIJC POLICY

[Vol. 20

forth by the prominent legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin.4 5
Another person in the debate over abortion might begin his
argument from the premise that encouraging human beings to
reach their end is valuable and, hence, those states of affairs that
promote humans reaching their ends should be encouraged.
Pope John Paul II has argued along these lines.46
The second characteristic is that while we make arguments
from incommensurable premises, we purport to use "impersonal
rational arguments" to argue that our opponent should or
should not believe a proposition, not because "I say so," but
because of some reason external to ourselves.4 7 So, in our
debates on abortion, opponents of abortion do not argue that
"abortion is wrong because I say it is." Instead, they argue that
abortion is wrong because it is the taking of innocent human life
that should receive the protection of the law. Proponents of a
right to abortion offer similarly impersonal arguments.
Third, MacIntyre shows that the incommensurable premises
from rival arguments have their home in different historical contexts.4 8 In the hypothetical abortion debate, the argument used
in Casey has its initial home in the Enlightenment thought, from
John Locke to more modern exponents such as John Rawls and
Ronald Dworkin.49 The arguments utilized by the Pope have
their home initially in Aristotle and Aquinas.5 °
Rival arguments are based on incommensurable premises
that "were originally at home in larger totalities of theory and
practice in which they enjoyed a role and function supplied by
contexts of which they have now been deprived."5" As a result, in
45.

See, e.g.,

RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAw: THE MORAL READING OF

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION ch.

46.

See, e.g.,

4 (1996).
II, ENCYCLICAL

POPE JOHN PAUL

LETYER EVANGELIUM VITAE

No. 2 (1995).
Man is called to a fullness of life which far exceeds the dimensions of his earthly existence, because it consists in sharing the very life
of God. The loftiness of this supernatural vocation reveals the greatness and the inestimable value of human life even in its temporal
phase. Life in time, in fact, is the fundamental condition, the initial
stage and an integral part of the entire unified process of human

existence.
Id.

supra note 1, at 8-9 (emphasis omitted).

47.
48.

MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE,

49.

See id. at 6-10 (giving modern arguments for and against abortion

Id. at 10.

that have their source in earlier ethical systems).

50.
et Ratio.

Id. Pope John Paul II's indebtedness to St. Thomas is explicit in Fides
POPE JOHN PAUL

II,

ENCYCLICAL LETTER FIDES ET RATIO Nos.

(1998).
51.

MAcINIYRE, AFrER VIRTUE,

supra note 1, at 10.

43-44
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our society it appears arbitrary when a person begins from one
premise rather than another: when a person chooses the premise
of autonomy rather than teleology. This leads to a pervasive de
facto emotivism where participants in debates on ethics assume
that arguments regarding morality are "nothing but expressions
of preference. '"52 Further, our society has no mechanism to
weigh or evaluate these conflicting premises. Hence, the continually rising decibel level of what passes for debate in our society:
if we, as a society, cannot rationally choose one premise over
another, then debate is useless and all that is left is protesting
and yelling, and coercion.
Maclntyre famously-and controversially-argued that
Western Civilization, and our society in particular, reached the
present point of moral disorder through a long period of
decline: the Enlightenment. 53 The period of the Enlightenment
was the time where Western civilization moved away from the
Aristotelian tradition, characterized primarily by the concept of
teleology, through successive attempts at "an independent
rational justification for morality. '' 54 The failure of the Enlightenment project of a non-teleological justification for morality has
created the moral disorder in our society where "moral debate [is
conducted] in terms of a confrontation between incompatible
and incommensurable moral premises and moral commitment
[is] the expression of criterionless choice between such premises,
a type of choice for which no rational justification can be
given."5 5
Relatedly, Maclntyre has argued that the university has
evolved through different stages that correspond to the rise,
dominance, and fall of the Enlightenment tradition. 56 The first
stage was the pre-modern stage, lasting from the creation of uni57
versities in the thirteenth century until the Enlightenment.
The pre-modern university was characterized by a common vision
of the good: what it means to live a good human life. 5 ' To create
52. Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
53. Id. at 38.
54. Id. at 37-38. In After Virtue MacIntyre reviews the thought of Kierkegaard, Kant, and Hume by placing them within their historical context of providing a philosophical justification for moral norms they inherited from the
preceding Christian culture. Id. at ch. 4.
55. Id. at 39.
56. MACINTtYE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 39,
at ch. 10.
57. Id. at 232-34; MACINTYRE, WHOSEJUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?, supra
note 38, at 206-07.
58. See MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?, supra note 38,
at 206 ("The past had provided a set of auctoritates."); id. at 399 ("Each such

68
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and maintain the common vision, a university ensured that the
educational background of its members was similar, and the university used mechanisms to maintain the common vision such as
religious tests and promotion based on adherence to the common vision of the good.5 9
The paradigmatic manifestation of the pre-modern university was the disputatio.6 ° A lecturer and his audience shared a
common understanding of which texts were authoritative and
the relationships of those texts.6 1 Following a lecture, the audience would dialectically test the lecturer's arguments in a disputatio.62 "It was just because both audience and lecturers accepted
standards of truth and rationality independent of either that
each could summon the other to test any particular thesis in the
forum of disputation, the intellectual equivalent of trial by
ordeal."6 3 So while there was ethical disagreement and debate, it
was not radical-it did not go to the premises employed by the
participants in the debate-and instead was constructive as the
participants built on a common foundation.6 4
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? MacIntyre presented an
extended review of Scottish society, including Scottish universities, in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.6 5 Scottish society possessed a common vision of the good centered on
an Aristotelianism refracted through the prism of Calvinist theology.66 This society provided a common education to leaders
such as ministers, professors, lawyers, and other professionals.6 7
It also maintained its common philosophical vision through noncoercive and coercive measures.68 Scottish society defended its
preliberal university was therefore to some degree an institution embodying
either one particular tradition of rational enquiry or a limited set of such
traditions.").
59. Id. at 399; MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY,
supra note 39, at 223-24.
60. MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 39,
at 32.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 32-33.
63. Id.
64. See MACINTIvRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note
39, at 223 ("[A]chievements in rational enquiry ...required as a precondition a
high degree of homogeneity in fundamental belief, especially as regarded standards of rational justification .... Creative rational disagreement characteristically takes place against a background of agreement. .. ").
65. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY?, supra note 38, at
chs. 12-16.
66. Id. at 209.
67. Id. at 220.
68. Id. at 239, 241-46.
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vision of the good through apologia by scholars, ministers, and
others.6 9 It also utilized state, church, and other institutions to
enforce the common vision.7 °
The second stage in the evolution of universities, brought
about by the dominance of the Enlightenment tradition, was the
liberal university. 7' The premise of the liberal university,
grounded in the Enlightenment tradition, was that an individual
qua individual could "objectively" approach knowledge and
determine what was and was not correct. 72 "The false premise"
of the liberal university was "that human rationality is such ...
[that] if freed from external constraints and most notably from
the constraints imposed by religious and moral tests, it will produce not only progress in enquiry but also agreement among all
rational persons. 7v3 Unlike the pre-modern university, its liberal
counterpart refused to enforce a common vision of the good. 4
How could it? The premise of the liberal university was that, if
presented with knowledge, all rational individuals would come to
the correct understanding of that knowledge, making coercion
unnecessary.7 5

The paradigmatic manifestation of the liberal university was
the lecture: the authoritative professor disseminated knowledge
to his listeners who were able to assimilate the knowledge into a
coherent whole .76 The professor's duty was to synthesize all of
the information on a given topic using the model of the natural
sciences, and offer it to the audience.7 7 Then, the members of
the audience, who were "all rational persons [that] conceptualize
data in one and the same way,"' 78 would assimilate the professor's
"encyclopaedic pronouncements. 7 9
Today, MacIntyre argued, the liberal university and its institutions are empty shells."0 The formerly unified philosophical
allegiance of the professoriate and the public has become "fragmented into a series of independent, specialized, and profes69. Id. at 247-59.
70. See id. at 241 (stating that ecclesiastical and secular courts defended
the common vision of the good); id. at 245-46 (describing heresy trials).
71.

MAcINTrRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY, supranote 39,

at 224-25.
72.
73.

Id. at 225.
Id.

74. Id.
75.

Id.

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at

33.
19-21.
16-17.
33.
216-18.

70
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sional activities."'" However, many of the institutions and
practices of the university that were formed during the period of
82
the liberal university remain as hollow reminders of a past era.
For example, does anyone any longer believe that a professor's lecture is simply an objective dissemination of knowledge?
Absent the previous "unified secular vision of the world and of
the place of knowledge and of enquiry within it" that served as
the foundation of the liberal university, today the lecture is
viewed as nothing more than one person's contestable view on a
particular topic.83 The lecture, according to MacIntyre, is a
"ghostly representation of the thinkers and thought" of the liberal university's founders.8 4
The university has, therefore, proceeded through stages of
evolution that correspond to the rise, dominance, and fall of the
Enlightenment tradition. The primary characteristic of today's
university is like that of our larger society: radical disagreement.
It is in light of this current state of affairs, and other manifestations of the university such as the pre-modern university, that I
will below discuss the possible roles of Christian law professors.
III.

ROLE(S) OF THE CHRISTIAN SCHOIAR: BUILDING,
REBUILDING, AND ENGAGING

A.

Introduction

If MacIntyre is right-and, with some qualifications, I think
he is-then Christian legal scholars play an important role in
preserving the truth and shining the light of the truth on our
culture. In this Part, I will argue that, assuming MacIntyre's analysis is correct, Christian legal scholars have three possible roles:
building communities of virtue, rebuilding communities of virtue, and engaging in the conflict between traditions. These roles
are not mutually exclusive: the same scholar may take on different roles at different points in his life, and the same scholar may
assume aspects of more than one role simultaneously. As will
become clear below, I believe that each role is important-and
accordingly Christian legal scholars must fill all of them-but the
roles of building and rebuilding (to the extent possible) communities of virtue should receive special attention.
81. Id. at 216. The fragmentation of the professoriate corresponds to a
fragmentation of education itself, where students specialize in one particular
profession. Id. at 217.
82. Id. at 218.
83. Id. at 216-18.
84. MAcIN-nRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 39,
at 217-18.
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B.

Building and Rebuilding Communities of Virtue

Maclntyre argued that our society is unable to achieve consensus on the great issues facing it. In response to our society's
radical disagreement, Christian legal scholars must first work to
build communities of virtue. A community of virtue is a group of
people who together share a common vision of the good. They
have essentially similar answers to questions regarding the meaning of reality, what it means to be human, and how one attains
integral human fulfillment.8 5 Central to this common vision is
the role of virtue, helping the individual achieve his end: happiness in this world and Beatitude8 6 in the next.
The paradigm example of a community of virtue is the
Church: church members have a common vision of the GoodGod-and work together to realize that Good. The Church is
also a good example for another reason: it is a non-geographic
community. In our society today, with its deep philosophical and
religious divisions and migrant populace, it is difficult any longer
to find a group of people located in a compact, recognizable geographic area who hold a common, thick vision of the good.8 7
Our nation's states and major cities are too populous to qualify.
Only in smaller groupings, such as a small town in Iowa or an
urban religious community, is it possible to have a community of
virtue defined geographically.8 8
85. ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAw 51 (1999) (describing integral human fulfillment).
86. As Aquinas stated:
It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness.
For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether;
else it would not be the last end if something yet remained to be
desired. Now the object of the will, i.e., of man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true.
Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will save the universal
good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone;

because every creature has goodness by participation alone. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man.... Therefore God alone
constitutes man's happiness.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I-II, Q. 2, Art. 8 (Benziger Bros.
1947).
87.

See, e.g.,

MICHAEL J. SANDEL,

SEARCH OF A PUBLIC POLICY

DEMOCRACY'S

DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN

13-17 (1996) (discussing competing thick and thin

visions of persons).
88. But even here, under the pervasive influence of the secular culture,
the common vision of the good-the community itself-is slipping away.
Unless parents are vigilant, the media will expose their children to antagonistic
belief systems. Absent strong religious and cultural commitments, divorce will
eat away at the solid family structure. Additionally, the lure of the community's
best and brightest to far-away jobs will, of course, inhibit the rise of local
leaders.
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Other than the quickly disappearing relics of a past age's
society, today's communities of virtue do and will take the form
of voluntary associations defined by membership in the association and not geography. The parish or congregation-and I will
argue the Christian law school-are focal examples of today's
local communities of virtue. Individuals who share a common
vision of the Good (a belief in Jesus) come together to pursue
that Good (worship Him). They may travel from a wide geographic area, live in different geographic locales, and live among
people with radically different visions of the good, but together,
they pursue the Good.
In a society such as ours, with its interminable ethical
debate, perhaps the primary role of Christian legal scholars is to
build communities of virtue.89 In the law school context, creating a common vision of the good includes a common understanding of the nature of law and the role law does and should
play in human society.9 ° Christian legal scholars must help build
communities of virtue because without that community it will be
difficult to impart-to teach-the true nature of law. Further,
Christians need to create communities of virtue where an accurate understanding of the law can be preserved and expounded
in a society hostile to that understanding.
Persons in our society have great difficulty agreeing on
issues of import because of their different philosophical allegiances. Law is no exception.9 1 A good example of this inability
to agree is the field of constitutional interpretation. Scholars
and judges make wildly divergent claims about what and whether
there is an appropriate mode of interpreting the Constitution.9 2
89. For a provocative vision of the Christian law school see Thomas L.
Shaffer, Erastian and Sectarian Arguments in Religiously Affiliated American Law
Schools, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1859, 1869-78 (1993). For a much different perspective see MichaelJ. Perry, The Idea of a Catholic University, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 325

(1995).
90. See Christopher Wolfe, The Ideal of a (Catholic) Law School, 78 MARQ. L.
REv. 487, 488 (1995) (listing some of the "general principles" of a "Catholic
vision of law").
91.
See Steven D. Smith, LAw's QUANDARY 19-21 (2004) (noting our
deeply conflicted legal discourse).
92. For a broad discussion of the division within constitutional interpretation and an argument that the division reflects a deeper philosophical divide,
see Lee J. Strang, The Clash of Rival and Incompatible Philosophical Traditions
Within Constitutional Interpretation: Originalism and the Aristotelian Tradition, 2
GEo. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 523 (2004). On one end of the spectrum are originalists, such as Justice Scalia, who have argued that judges may use only the original meaning of the Constitution to strike down acts of the elected branches. See
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW
(1997). Justice Scalia based his argument on the fact that the Constitution is "a
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In a secular law school, the radical disagreement from the
broader society spills over. The faculty disagrees about the
nature of law, and faculty and students disagree as well (although
not at the level of sophistication as the intra-faculty disagreement). In this environment the most one can generally expect is
to teach the "black-letter" law: what this case means and how the
court arrived there. One will not be able to fruitfully teach why a
case is wrong or why an interpretative methodology is correct.
In fact, in a secular law school one may have difficulty in
teaching simply the positive-"black letter"-law because of the
deep disagreements that exist regarding "what the law is." For
instance, a student who takes-either explicitly or intuitively-a
Marxist approach to law will not agree with a professor who has a
Dworkinian view of law. The professor will argue that the law in
principle can arrive at one correct answer to legal questions and
proposed how judges do so.9 3 The Marxist student, by contrast,
will reject any such argument, because the student's premise is
that law is part of the social superstructure of legitimation; simply
a mask for domination that judges enforce.9 4 As a result, the
great distance between members of secular law schools regarding
the nature of law will dramatically impede teaching the true
nature of law.
Relatedly, many students will have difficulty perceiving the
truth because of their background. Even the concept of virtueas habits of good character that one forms over a lifetime-is
foreign to many Americans and law students are no exception.
The odds are against people striving for and obtaining virtue
who come of age in our current culture. First, given the absence
of the very notion of virtue in our popular culture, 5 it is difficult
for youth to strive to possess it. Second, one of the key notions in
the Aristotelian tradition is that while all persons have the capacdemocratically adopted text." Id. at 40. I have argued elsewhere that the most
powerful understanding of originalism-an argument Justice Scalia employsis based on the Aristotelian tradition. Strang, supra, at 568-70. On the other
end are non-originalists who argue that judges may use normative values in
place of, or in addition to, the original meaning. Ronald Dworkin, for example, has argued that judges must employ the "morally best" conception of
democracy-democracy with conditions such as "equal concern and respect"and hence may strike down acts of the elected branches that do not treat members of our society with equal concern and respect. DwoRUIN, supra note 45, at
7-8, 15-19. The premise of Dworkin's theory is a strongly individualistic understanding of human beings.
93. RONALD DWORKIN, TAFNG RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 286 (1977).
94. See, e.g., Karl Klare, Law-Making as Praxis, 40 TELOS 123 (1979).
95. See MTV Home Page, http://www.mtv.com (last visited Mar. 24,
2006).
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ity for virtue, without social assistance-either from family, subsidiary communities, or the government-that capacity will not
be realized for many people.9 6 Our society not only does not aid
in the cultivation of virtue, it often inverts vice and virtue and
encourages young people to reject traditional mores.9 7 This
leads to law students who lack the virtues-the habits of character-that would enable them to recognize the truth.
Without a modicum of virtue, one may not recognize the
truth or may reject what one knows is the truth.9 8 As a result, a
law professor may, for instance, present an accurate understanding of the law, but the student will be unable or unwilling to
accept that understanding.
In light of the obstacles faced by those who teach in secular
law schools, obstacles that hinder Christian legal scholars from
effectively imparting a full understanding of the law, Christian
legal scholars should carefully consider the alternative of teaching in a Christian law school community. In a Christian law
school, a Christian legal scholar will have colleagues and students
who begin from the same foundational-even if, in the case of
students, inchoate-understanding of human beings, society,
and the law. Further, in the Christian law school, students are
generally eager and able to receive a full understanding of the
law because of their habits of character. Of course, this is not to
say that secular law schools do not have many faculty and students who also start from the same foundational premises and
possess the necessary habits of character, only that, depending
on the circumstances, it is more likely that such individuals will
be found in the setting of the Christian law school.
A further reason to build communities of virtue is that these
communities will preserve and expound the rich heritage of
Christian belief, theology, and philosophy in a hostile society and
legal academy.9 9 A good example of this phenomenon is the way
96. ARISTOTLE, NICoMACHEAN
Hackett Publ'g Co. 1985).

ETHICS

1103a-b (Terence Irwin trans.,

97. See Patricia Gurin, Expert Report Submitted on Behalf of the University of
Michigan: The Compelling Need for Diversity in HigherEducation, 5 MICH. J. RACE &

L. 363, 368 (1999) (arguing that the purpose of higher education is to
encourage student "experiment [ation]" with different "philosoph [ies] of life").
98. ARISTOTLE, supra note 96, at 1179b-1180a ("For he that lives in obedience to passion cannot hear any advice that would dissuade him, nor, if he
heard, understand.").
99. See William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARv. L. REv. 1707,
1711-12 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT
(Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001)) ("[T] he conventional wisdom among
legal academics [is]: religious convictions should be kept out of debates about
law and politics.").
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in which Christian law schools preserve and build upon the natural law tradition. As noted by Christopher Wolfe, "[n]atural law
teaching ... would be an essential part of [the] framework" of a

Christian law school, '0 The natural law tradition, once the foundation of Western legal thought, has today largely been relegated
to the margins of secular discourse. In contrast, Christian law
schools, through their teaching and scholarship, continue to
emphasize natural law.
At Ave Maria School of Law, where I teach, the natural law is
incorporated into the curriculum in each class, as appropriate. 1° 1
Many of the professors at Ave Maria explicitly rely on the natural
law tradition in their scholarship.10 2 They make arguments that
are unique in the scholarly discourse." 3 The nurturing community at Ave Maria makes this possible in a way that secular law
schools cannot because of institutional constraints.
I believe current examples of Christian legal scholars
attempting to build legal communities of virtue include: Ave
Maria, Liberty, Regent, and St. Thomas. Each of these institutions is attempting to create a community of Christian legal
scholars who teach, preserve, and expound the Christian understanding of the law.
How should Christian scholars go about building communities of virtue? To have a community of virtue, the members of
the community must share a common vision of the good and,
particularly, of the law. Christian law professors building a Christian law school will need to use that common vision as a criterion
for the institution's important decisions. When hiring faculty,
for example, the law school will want to ensure that the candidates possess a Christian vision of the law, without which they will
be less able to teach, write scholarship, and engage in public
advocacy for that understanding.1 0 4 The hiring criteria for a
Christian law school "would be all the usual characteristics of
100. Wolfe, supra note 90, at 488.
101. See id. at 489-90 (arguing that in a Catholic law school the natural
law tradition along with Catholic social thought "would help to provide a unifying principle undergirding (and, ideally, infusing) much of the 'standard' law
school curriculum . . . ").

102. See, e.g., Kevin P. Lee, Deeper Longings: The Relevance of Christian Theology for Contemporary Rights Theories, 3 AxV MARIA L. REV. 289 (2005); Edward C.
Lyons, In Cognito-The Principle of Double Effect in American ConstitutionalLaw, 57
FIA. L. REV. 469 (2005).
103. See Patrick McKinley Brennan, ChristianPerspectives on Legal Thought,
16 J.L. & RELIGION 667, 668 (2001) (book review) ("Christians have distinct
perspectives on law .... ").
104. See RobertJ. Araujo, "The Harvest is Plentiful, but the Laborers are Few":
Hiring Practices and Religiously Affiliated Universities, 30 U. RICH. L. REv. 713
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professional legal excellence, plus willingness to accept and an
ability to contribute to the purpose or mission of the
school ... ."0 This is not to say that a Christian law school must
be "exclusively a community of believers ....
"'°6 However, to

achieve its goal of a common understanding of the law, a sufficient percentage of faculty must attend to the common understanding such that it is the community's understanding.
Similarly, the Christian law school will encourage incorporation
of the Christian understanding of the law in teaching, scholarship, 10 7 communal life, and public advocacy.
Much of the discussion above is applicable to Christian legal
scholars who are attempting to rebuild communities of virtue.
There are many law schools that were initially founded as Christian institutions, but have lost the Christian vision of law.'
In
these institutions, Christian scholars must work to rebuild a common, Christian vision of the law."0 9
The most prominent examples of law schools that lost their
initial Christian orientation are Harvard and Yale. Both institutions were founded as Christian seminaries and their law schools
were created during the period when the broader universities
remained recognizably Christian. Yet, over the course of the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, these law schools eliminated-whether intentionally or not"°-the common Christian
vision of the law. Today Harvard and Yale law schools are paradigmatic examples of modern secular institutions characterized
by deep and fundamental disagreement on every issue of
substance.
To reverse the secularization of their institutions, those
rebuilding Christian law schools should consider hiring
"candidates who would enthusiastically support and further the
mission of the religiously affiliated school.""' They will also
(1996) (discussing the legal, practical, and theological implications of hiring to
preserve the Christian character of a law school).
105. Wolfe, supra note 90, at 500.
106. Mark A. Sargent, An Alternative to the Sectarian Vision: The Role of the
Dean in an Inclusive Catholic Law School, 33 U. TOL. L. REv. 171, 181 (2001).
107. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W.
McConnell et al. eds., 2001).
108. GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY:. FROM
PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 440 (1994).
109. For a discussion of the difficulty and costs entailed by rebuilding a
Christian law school see Sargent, supra note 106, at 179.
110. See MARSDEN, supra note 108, at 5 (arguing that the shift was
unintentional).
111. Araujo, supra note 104, at 768.
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(re) incorporate the Christian vision of law into teaching, scholarship, community life, and public advocacy.
One example of an institution where Christian law professors are rebuilding a common, Christian vision of the law is Villanova. It has strong Christian roots that became attenuated. And
in it Christian law professors are at work rebuilding a community
of virtue.
C.

Working from Within Secular Institutions:Engaging in the
Debate

Returning to a central theme of his work, MacIntyre argued
in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry that our present condition
is characterized by a radical pluralism, which makes institutional
and society-wide moral inquiry "barren" because of the lack of
any common ground from which to build.' 12 Our society no
longer has a common standard of moral inquiry. Our society can
no longer evaluate claims regarding morality because individuals
and communities employ different evaluative criteria to judge
the efficacy of such claims.' 1 3 "What then is possible?" asks
Maclntyre. 1 4
The answer is: the university is a place of constrained disagreement, of imposed participation in conflict in which a
central responsibility of higher education would be to initiate students into conflict. In such a university those
engaged in teaching and enquiry would each have to play a
double role. For, on the one hand, each of us would be
participating in conflict as the protagonist of a particular
point of view.... On the other hand, each of us would also

have to play a second role, that not of a partisan, but of
someone concerned to uphold and to order the ongoing
conflicts, to provide and sustain institutionalized means for
112. MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note
39, at 216, 227.
113. The lack of any agreed-upon standard for evaluating moral claims in
our society has led philosophers to attempt to construct a means for members
in a radically pluralistic society, such as our own, to arrive at the minimum
consensus necessary to continue to live together in social cooperation. See, e.g.,
JOHN RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 4-5 (rev. ed. 1999) (1971) ("Some measure
of agreement in conceptions ofjustice is, however, not the only prerequisite for
a viable human community."). Rawls wanted to do so without appealing to the
competing contested standards employed to evaluate moral claims. See ROBERT

P.

GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL: CIL

LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALIrY

133

(1993) [hereinafter GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL] ("The function of the veil
[of ignorance] . . .is to eliminate bias from the selection of principles of
justice . . ").
114. MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 37, at 230-31.
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their expression, to negotiate the modes of encounter
between opponents, to ensure that rival voices were not
illegitimately suppressed, to sustain the university ... as an

arena of conflict in which the most fundamental type of
moral and theological disagreement was accorded
recognition. 115
A last role for the Christian legal scholar-and one, by
necessity, which most Christian legal scholars will take up-is
described by Maclntyre as having two components: (1) advocating one particular view; and (2) maintaining the institutional
structures within which competing views may interact.
The first component of the Christian legal scholar's role in a
secular institution is to offer a true understanding of the nature
and role of law to students, colleagues, and the broader public.
Like his counterpart in the Christian law school, he will present a
coherent vision of the nature of law that is better than other,
competing views.
For instance, the Christian legal scholar will provide students with access to seminal explanations of the Christian understanding of law. In contracts class, he might have students read
the later Scholastics' explanation of the nature and role of contract."' 6 By going through these Christian philosophers, he will
allow others to come inside the Cathedral, so to speak; he will
allow others to see the rich depth of the Christian legal tradition
and how it better fits and justifies their own lived experience of
contract. Then, the Christian legal scholar will offer the students
competing visions of contract law rooted in a different, competing philosophical tradition. After reviewing our actual American
contract doctrines, he will ask his students which of these competing views best explains and justifies our American contract
doctrines. In this way, the Christian law professor conforms to
the norms of his secular institution, while also advancing the
Christian understanding of the law.
This component of the Christian legal scholar's role is challenging because, if Maclntyre is right, then it is very difficult to
show those who adhere to another understanding of law-either
consciously or unconsciously-why the Christian understanding
of law is correct. This is a difficult process for a couple of reasons
115.

Id.

116.

See, e.g.,James Gordley, The MoralFoundations of PrivateLaw, 47 AM.J.

JuRIS. 1, 1 (2002) (arguing that the philosophical foundation that best fits and
justifies American private law is the Aristotelian tradition as explained by the
Spanish Scholastics).
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discussed above. 1 17 First is the possibility that the recipient will
not be able correctly to perceive the truth of what is offered. The
recipient might not possess the habits of character, the lack of
which impedes his ability to recognize the truth.
Secondly-and less provocatively-the understanding of law
(effectively) followed in our society and in secular law schools is
liberal (liberty enhancing); it is the lived tradition. This makes it
difficult to show another the rich depth of the Christian vision
without somehow showing them the lived tradition, the tradition
put into practice. As Maclntyre argued regarding Aquinas'
accomplishment in synthesizing the rival and incompatible
Augustinian and Aristotelian traditions: to understand the claims
made by rival and incompatible traditions one must "inhabit...
both alternative conceptual schemes, [one must] know ...

and

[be] able to utter the idiom of each from within, [one must]
become, so to speak, a native speaker of two first languages, each
with its own distinctive conceptual idiom.'1 8 Therefore, unless
one becomes conversant in the Christian understanding of the
nature of law, one will have difficulty in accepting that understanding as correct.
A prominent example of a Christian legal scholar who has
performed this first component well-advancing the Christian
understanding of the law-is Robert P. George at Princeton.
George is well credentialed by any standard-he received his
Juris Doctor from Harvard Law School and his doctorate in legal
philosophy from Oxford.' 19 He holds the prestigious McCormick Chair of Jurisprudence at Princeton University.'
George has utilized his position, first of all, to teach an accurate understanding of the law to his students. His classes are well
subscribed, and for many of his students, this is their first exposure to the Christian vision of law. 121 George is able to offer his
117. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text (discussing the difficulties of imparting the Christian understanding of law in the context of a secular
law school).
118. MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note
39, at 114.
119. See EXECUTIVE ComMITrEE, JAMES MADISON PROGRAM IN AMERICAN
IDEALS AND INSTITUTIONS,

http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison/people/

committee.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2005).

120. Anne Morse, The Conservative Heavyweight: The Remarkable Mind of
Robert P. George, CRisis, Sept. 2003, at 36-42.
121. See id. ("George's class on constitutional interpretation and civil liberties are huge by Princeton standards and always jammed despite his reputation as a tough-grading GPA-wrecker.").
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students a cogent and coherent view of the Christian
understand1 22
ing of law, and his efforts are not without success.
Of course, George's position at an elite secular institution
also provides him with opportunities to spread the Christian
vision of the law beyond the classroom. George is a prolific and
popular scholar whose work defending natural law is both widely
read and influential. 123 George has engaged, through his work,
the leading secular minds of the day. 124 George has also had
animpact through the media where he writes and appears in
125
many fora.
The second component of the Christian legal scholar's role
in secular institutions is preserving the institution as a forum for
the clash of differing views. MacIntyre argued that in today's university, one of the roles of university members will be to "sustain
the university... as an arena of conflict in which the most fundamental type of moral and theological disagreement [i]s accorded
26
recognition.'

Christian legal scholars can fulfill this aspect of their role in
many ways. Primarily they can do so through their own engagement in the scholarly debate, both within their law school and in
the broader legal academy and society. Christian law professors
can also create institutional means of preserving a space within
the university to present and debate about unpopular views, such
as the Christian vision of law.
Again, Robert P. George is a good example. George created
the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions.127 The Madison Program is an entity within Princeton
University that addresses questions and issues central to our society, in light of American ideals.1 28 Students may take classes
122. Id.
123. See id. (discussing George's impact on the broader public).
124. See, e.g.,
GEORGE, MAKING MEN MORAL, supra note 113 (discussing a
wide array of influential contemporary philosophers).
125. Morse, supra note 120 (discussing George's impact on the broader
public).
126. MACINTYRE, THREE RrVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note
39, at 230-31.
127. See James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions,
http://web.princeton.edu/sites/jmadison (last visited Mar. 24, 2006).
128. See id. The University identifies the mission of the Madison program
as an inquiry into:
[T]he nature of free political institutions and the cultural conditions
for their establishment and maintenance; the relationship between
political institutions and institutions of civil society, and that between
political liberty and civic virtue; the implications of such doctrines as
the rule of law, subsidiarity, and social solidarity for the scope and
limits of governmental authority; federalism; the moral bases of pri-
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under the auspices of the Madison Program, and scholars may
visit as fellows of the Program, and many work in the Program
teaching students.12 9
Through the Madison Program, George is able to offer students an extended study of the law grounded in a Christian, natural law understanding. The importance of this extended study
cannot be overestimated. To come to grasp-and eventually to
assent

to13°-a

particular vision of the law, one must in effect

learn to speak a second language. One must learn to use different concepts-teleology, for example-and one must learn to
apply familiar concepts in new ways. 13 ' This takes time. Perhaps
more importantly, it takes a teacher (a master) who is fluent in
the tradition to guide one to that new understanding.1 32 Institutions like George's Madison Program provide these necessary
ingredients; they provide a space within which debate over the
nature of law can take place within a secular university.
D.

Activities of ChristianLegal Scholars: Not Limited by Their
Role(s)

Although the activities a particular Christian legal scholar
takes on are to some extent determined by the nature of the
scholar's institution and his role within that institution, Christian
legal scholars, regardless of their institutional affiliation, should
engage in other activities as well. This means that all Christian
legal scholars should engage in professional and public debate
through scholarship; that all Christian legal scholars should publicly advocate for the Christian vision of the law; and that all
Christian legal scholars should build communities of virtue,
though of course, the particular type of community will vary.
The Christian law school-and the Christian legal scholars
that are the heart of the school-fulfill roles that their secular
vate property and free enterprise; the constitutional separation of
powers and systems of checks and balances; executive leadership; democratic deliberation and accountability; judicial independence and the
scope and limits ofjudicial power; America's role in the world and the
conduct of her relations with foreign powers; and the place of religion
and religiously informed moral judgment in American public life.

Id. at Mission page.
129. See id.
130. For a discussion of the meaning of "assent," see JOHN
NAL NEWMAN, AN EssAY IN AID OF A GRAMMAR OF ASSENT

HENRY

CARDI-

(Notre Dame Press

1979) (1870).
131. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing Maclntyre's
argument of how one comes to understanding a rival philosophical tradition).
132. For an understanding of the role of the craft analogy in the Aristotelian tradition, see infra note 144.
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counterparts can only fulfill at the margins. These roles, as discussed above, include teaching a true understanding of the law
and preserving and building upon that understanding. However,
Christian legal scholars at Christian law schools have additional
roles not directly related to creating communities of virtue, roles
more analogous to those, discussed above, that Christian legal
scholars should play in secular institutions.
Christian legal scholars should engage in public advocacy.
Our society is deeply torn over fundamental issues, issues which
in our society are also legal issues. Alexis de Tocqueville's characterization of our society remains accurate: "There is almost no
political question in the United States that is not resolved sooner
or later into a judicial question."' 3 Christian legal scholars possess the tools to be effective advocates to influence those open to
persuasion. There are numerous means open to Christian legal
scholars: scholarship, public speaking, and the media. The
means chosen will depend on the anticipated audience. The law
school and legal community are reached through scholarship
and debate. The larger society is reached through public speaking and the media.
Scholarship is an especially important avenue. Ideas matter,
and it is through scholarship that the Christian vision of the law
can best be articulated, refined, and offered to the legal and
broader publics. One small example of the impact Christian
legal scholars can have is the contemporary revival in natural law,
which many attribute to John Finnis and his book, Natural Law
and NaturalRights.'
Finnis' goal was to offer "a re-presentation
and development of main elements of the 'classical' or 'main
stream' theories of natural law."' 3 5 In this vein, Neil MacCormick has argued that Natural Law and Natural Rights "has
brought back to life the classical Thomistic/Aristotelian theory of
natural law."' 3 6
Anglo-American jurisprudence, outside of Catholic law
schools,' 3 7 has for years been dominated by a caricature of natu133.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

257 (Harvey C.

Mansfield & Delba Winthrop eds. & trans., Univ. of Chi. Press 2000) (1835).
134. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980).
135. Id. at v.
136. Neil MacCormick, NaturalLaw and the Separationof Law and Morals,
in NATURAL LAw THEORY: CONTEMPORARY ESSAYS 105 (Robert P. George ed.,

1992).
137. And even in many Catholic law schools it appears discussion of natural law is absent. John M. Breen, Justice andJesuit Legal Education:A Critique, 36
LoY. U. CHI. LJ. 383 (2005).
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ral law and by a strong positivist strain.' 3 8 Finnis' work helped
make claims about and arguments from natural law respectable,
or at least within the pale of respectability. My own experience
has confirmed this. While studying at Harvard Law School, I was
speaking with a professor about my master's thesis and specifically about the natural law tradition. The professor, educated at
one of the most prestigious universities and law schools, had very
little knowledge of the tradition, and was skeptical of it, but he
had read Natural Law and Natural Rights, and he respected it.
E.

What Role(s) a Christian Legal Scholar Should Assume

One of the most difficult questions a Christian legal scholar
must face-after answering the question of whether one should
become a Christian legal scholar-is what role(s) one should
assume. 3 9 There are, I believe, a number of ways by which one
can answer this important question.
Before addressing how Christian law professors answer the
question of what role(s) they should assume, I will first discuss
the ontological orientation one must have in order to correctly
answer the question.1 4 ° As followers of Jesus Christ, we have oriented ourselves-our being-towards Him.14 1 God's will for
human beings, which is built into our teleological nature, is to
know Him, love Him, and serve Him.14 2 As a result, before one
can ask the question of what role(s) one should assume-with
the expectation of correctly seeking an answer to the questionone must first possess the requisite grace 4 ' and character. With138. See MacCormick, supra note 136, at 106 (discussing the dominant
false understanding of natural law).
139. For a broader discussion of Christian vocation see GERMAIN GRISEZ &
RUSSELL SHAW, PERSONAL VOCATION: GOD CALLS EVERYONE BY NAME (2003).
140. The question of what role(s) a Christian legal scholar should assume
presupposes and is a narrower manifestation of a law professor's faithfulness to
the Great Commission: "Go, therefore, and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit,
teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you." Matthew 28:19-20.

141.

See

CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH

No.

1694 (2d ed. 2000)

("Following Christ and united with him, Christians can strive to be 'imitators of
God as beloved children, and walk in love' by conforming their thoughts,
words, and actions to the 'mind . . . which is yours in Christ Jesus,' and by
following his example.").
142. Id. at No. 1721.
143. I have not thought through whether one must possess both grace
and virtue or whether, in some cases, virtue alone will suffice to enable one to
accurately seek an answer. My initial belief is that one must possess both qualities because one is seeking to answer the question of what role a Christianlegal
scholar should assume, and thus one must first have a relationship with Jesus to
understand what roles one could and should assume when one is a Christian.
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out these qualities, one will not have the ability to seek an answer
in the appropriate
manner or to know when one has found the
144
correct answer.

1 45
Given the appropriate disposition to be open to God's call
and the requisite qualities to properly seek and know the answer
when one finds it, I will turn to some of the possible means by
which a Christian legal scholar may come to know his role(s) his
calling(s). First, and most dramatically, is direct personal revelation from God. God could simply manifest His will to the individual-either as a voice or through some other mode of
manifestation.
Perhaps the most compelling example of God doing so is
Jesus' questioning of Saul of Tarsus: "'Saul, Saul, why dost thou

persecute me? . . . I am Jesus, whom thou art persecuting."146

Jesus spoke to Saul in an audible voice. 14 7 There are countless
other, only slightly less dramatic, means for God to manifest His
will to us. In answer to a prayer, He might speak to us through
Scripture. 148 Alternatively, He might open some and close other
An analogous situation is where a person is seeking to answer the question
of what it means to be-to assume the role of-a Christian father. A virtuous
non-Christian man would arrive at the best understanding of what it means to
be a father, but that understanding would not encompass within it aspects of
fatherhood that the virtuous Christian man would understand the role of father
to include. For instance, the virtuous Christian man's understanding would
include teaching his children about the personal sanctification that one can
acquire through suffering in union with Jesus. See, e.g., Colossians 1:24 ("I
rejoice now in the sufferings I bear for your sake; and what is lacking of the
sufferings of Christ I fill up in my flesh for his body which is the Church.").
144. The argument presented here is a variant of the craft analogy which
is prominent in the Aristotelian tradition. In short, the craft analogy is the idea
that absent obtaining the skills necessary for the craft, one cannot judge a particular specimen of the craft as good or bad because one does not adequately
know the standards of the craft. My understanding of the craft analogy is taken
in large measure from MAcIhrvRE, THREE RivAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY,
supra note 39, at 127-33.
145. For a discussion of the nature of a Divine calling or vocation see
Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, Integrationas Integrity: Postmodernism,Psychology, and Religion on the Role of Moral Counseling in the Attorney-Client Relationship, 16 REGENT U.
L. REv. 233, 257-59 (2004).
146. Acts 9:4-5.
147. See id. at 9:7 ("The men who journeyed with him ... hear[d] indeed
the voice.").
148. Consider the final call of St. Augustine:
Now when deep reflection had drawn up out of the secret depths
of my soul all my misery and had heaped it up before the sight of my
heart, there arose a mighty storm, accompanied by a mighty rain of
tears.... I flung myself down under a fig tree ... and gave free course
to my tears.... I cried to Thee: "And Thou, 0 Lord, how long? How
long, 0 Lord? Wilt Thou be angry forever? Oh, remember not
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doors to us, a manifestation often only understood with hindsight. 49 Of course, He may speak to us through others. 5 °
Another possible means for one to discern God's will is
through the gifts, talents, and inclinations one possesses. 15 ' God
creates some individuals with a specific combination of gifts and
inclinations1 52 whose full expression can only occur within one
or a few specific life-plans.1 53 If one has a love of plants and animals and has the virtue of performing hard physical labor, then
one should consider farming as a possible occupation. If one has
a love of debate, both oral and written, and if one has the intellectual capability to write and speak persuasively, then one
should consider practicing law as a possible occupation.
against us our former iniquities." For I felt that I was still enthralled by
them....
I was saying these things and weeping in the most bitter contrition
of my heart, when suddenly I heard the voice of a boy or girl I know
not which-coming from the neighboring house, chanting over and
over again, "Tolle et lege; tolle et lege." ... So damning the torrent of my
tears, I got to my feet, for I could not but think that this was a divine
command to open the Bible and read the first passage I should light
upon ....
... I snatched [up the Bible], and in silence read the paragraph
on which my eyes first fell: "Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in
chambering and wantonness, not in strife and envying, but put on the
Lord Jesus Christ, and make no provision for the flesh to fulfill the
lusts thereof."... [I] nstantly, as the sentence ended, there was infused
in my heart something like the light of full certainty and all the gloom
of doubt vanished away.
ST. AUGUSTINE, CONFESSIONS 170-71 (Albert C. Outler trans., Thomas Nelson
1999).
149. For example, St. Ignatius of Loyola's conversion occurred when he
turned from his life as a soldier to become a servant of Jesus. As St. Ignatius
himself describes it: "Until the age of twenty-six he was a man given over to
vanities of the world; with a great and vain desire to win fame he delighted
especially in the exercise of arms." ST. IGNATIUS LoYoLA, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF ST. IGNATIUs LOYOLA 21 (John C. Olin ed., Joseph F. O'Callaghan trans.,
Fordham Univ. Press 1992). After being wounded and forced to recuperate, St.
Ignatius read "a Life of Christ and a book of the lives of the saints." Id. at
21-23. This was a period of great reflection on his former way of life and on his
future life, and upon the happening of a vision of Mary holding the infant
Jesus, St. Ignatius reoriented himself to follow the Lord. Id. at 23-25.
150. For example, God spoke to the Jewish people and to individuals
through prophets such as Samuel and Isaiah.
151. GRISEZ & SHAW, supra note 139, at 99.
152. See, e.g., Jeremiah 1:5 ("Before I formed you in the womb I knew you,
and before you were born I consecrated you.").
153. For a discussion of the concept of life-plans, see FINNIS, supra note
134, at 103-05.
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Christian legal scholars have different combinations of talents and inclinations. 154 Some are very adept at persuasively discussing deeply contested issues with colleagues and students who
do not share the same fundamental premises. Such scholars
should consider teaching at a secular institution. Others are
equally adept at cooperating with colleagues and students to
scholars should
build upon agreed fundamental premises. These
155
consider teaching at a Christian institution.
When deciding what particular role to assume-when trying
to discern God's will for them-Christian legal scholars should
also consider the needs of the Church and society.1 56 This may,
in some instances, lead the Christian law professor to, as St. Paul
157
wrote, "do not do what I want, but do the very thing I hate.
For example, in a society that is in a state of severe decline, as the
Roman state of Benedict's time arguably was, the greatest need of
that society may be to build communities of virtue to preserve the
truth while the society's other institutions fail.
Our society, I believe, is one where Christian legal scholars
should take up all three roles discussed above: building communities of virtue, rebuilding communities of virtue, and working
within secular institutions. Our society has a need for all the
roles Christian legal scholars can perform. Christian law schools
are valuable as institutions to teach effectively the Christian
vision of law, preserve that vision, and more effectively explore
that vision through scholarship and discussion. Christian legal
scholars are needed in secular institutions to defend and advance
the Christian understanding of law, and to preserve the structured debate that can occur in these institutions.
1 58
Each of us is called, by God, to a particular vocation.
However, it is often difficult to discern what God is asking of us
except "in the unfolding of the history of our lives and its
events."1'59
154. See U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, STEWARDSHIP: A DisciPLE'S RESPONSE 20 (10th Anniv. Ed. 2002) ("Each has received a different
'sum'-a unique mix of talents, opportunities, challenges, weaknesses and
strengths, potential modes of service and response-on which the Master
expects a return.").
155. Saint Paul repeatedly exhorted Christians to use their respective gifts
to fulfill their respective callings. See Romans 12:4-8; 1 Corinthians12:14, 19, 28.
156. GRiSEZ & SHAW, supra note 139, at 78 ("A personal calling from God
is not an invitation to pursue individualistic self-fulfillment apart from the
needs and interests of others.").
157. Romans 7:15.
158. John 10:3 ("[H]e calls his own sheep by name.").
159.

POPE JOHN PAUL II, POST-SYNODAL APOSTOLIC EXHORTATION CHRIS-

TIFIDELES LAIci No. 58 (1988).
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F.

The Christian Law Professor as the Modern St. Benedict

Saint Benedict left the crumbling Roman society to found a
monastery at Monte Cassino, which became the pattern for Western monasticism for the next six hundred years. In doing so, St.
Benedict was instrumental in preserving the learning of the classical era, but the monasteries he helped create also-slowlyformed a new society through a synthesis of the old and the new:
the dying classical world and the new Germanic nations that
occupied Europe.
The Christian law professor's vocation in our society is the
same: preserving and creating. The Christian law professor has
the role of preserving the Christian understanding of law: preserving the best of Western civilization's legal thought. To do so,
he will build (and rebuild) Christian law schools. Further, Christian legal scholars will synthesize a Christian understanding of
law that meets the challenges of today's world.
But how Christian scholars live out their roles is different.
Christian legal scholars are not retreating within monastic walls.
Instead it is through engagement with the legal community and
broader culture that they will synthesize and expound a Christian
understanding of law that meets the challenges of today's world.
CONCLUSION

I have proposed that Christian law professors should see
themselves and their roles in accord with MacIntyre's call for a
modern St. Benedict. In this Article, I attempted to explain why.
First, I reviewed St. Benedict's life and argued that he created the
institution-Western monasticism-that preserved much of classical civilization and was instrumental in synthesizing a new, Christian civilization. Second, I discussed the state of American
culture as diagnosed by MacIntyre.
I then proposed how Christian legal scholars should
respond: what our roles are in American society. I argued that
Christian law professors have three analytically distinct possible
roles: building Christian law schools, rebuilding Christian law
schools, and what I labeled, engaging in the debate. Each
scholar may assume different roles over his career and aspects of
more than one role concurrently.
Then I briefly discussed how one knows what role(s) one
should assume, as a Christian legal scholar. Lastly, I returned to
St. Benedict and how his legacy of preserving and creating offers
a model for Christian law professors fifteen hundred years later.

